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Pablo J. Vázquez Veira. Universidad de Alicante
ABSTRACT In this study we analyse whether the use of IASB standards affects the conservatism of
earnings of the firms that adopt them. We compare the conservatism of firms by groups of firms/coun-
tries using or not IAS. Our results show that 1) Earnings conservatism is, as pointed out in prior re-
search, more pronounced in common-law-based developed economies; 2) The voluntary use of IASB
standards in Europe (prior to 2005) has significantly increased the measures of earnings conservatism
in adopting firms, and 3) The use of IAS fails to improve the relevance and reliability of accounting in-
formation in emerging/developing countries, where enforcement and investor protection is low.
KEYWORDS Earnings properties; Conservatism; Accounting Standards, IASB.
RESUMEN En este trabajo se analiza si el uso de las normas del IASB afecta al conservadurismo del
resultado de las empresas que las adoptan. Para ello comparamos el conservadurismo por grupos de
empresas/países que usan o no las normas internacionales (NIC). Nuestros resultados muestran que:
1) El conservadurismo del resultado es, tal y como pone de manifiesto la literatura previa, más pro-
nunciado en los países desarrollados basados en el derecho común, 2) La adopción voluntaria de las
normas del IASB en Europa (antes de 2005) aumentó significativamente las medidas de conservadu-
rismo del resultado de las empresas que las adoptaron, y 3) El uso de las NIC no logró mejorar la re-
levancia/fiabilidad de la información contable en los países emergentes o en vías de desarrollo, donde
la protección de los intereses de los inversores es escasa.
PALABRAS CLAVE Propiedades del resultado; Conservadurismo; Normas Contables; IASB.
1.  INTRODUCTION
In this study we analyse whether earnings conservatism (bad news recognized in earnings
on a timelier basis than good news) of firms using IASB standards differs significantly from
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tribution from the Spanish Ministry of Education and Science (SEJ2005-08644-C02-01/ECON and SEJ2007-67582-C02-
02ECON).
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earnings conservatism of firms using local GAAP(1). Ball, Kothari and Robin (2000), Ball, Ro-
bin and Wu (2003), García Lara, García Osma and Mora (2005) and Bushman and Piotros-
ki (2006) among others, argue that differences in conservative practices affecting the pro-
fit and loss account across countries are attributable to different institutional settings (for
example, different litigation risk), and that the use of a common set of accounting standards
will not contribute to reduce the differences in the properties of earnings if the differences
in the institutional settings remain. In a similar vein, Ball et al. (2003) conclude that high
quality standards do not guarantee high-quality financial reporting practices in develo-
ping/emerging countries without proper enforcement mechanisms.
The success of the implementation of IASB standards in Europe (and also in other coun-
tries) hinges crucially on whether the use of the standards will make accounting informa-
tion more comparable, relevant and reliable. To analyse whether IASB standards are able
to change the attributes of accounting earnings, we analyse the differences in the as-
ymmetric timeliness of earnings (earnings conservatism) in 58 countries, comparing firms
that use local GAAP with those that use IASB standards. We choose to analyse earnings con-
servatism because: 1) It has been shown that better governed firms report more conser-
vative earnings as a response to investors demands (Beekes, Pope and Young, 2004; Ah-
med and Duellman, 2007; García Lara, García Osma and Penalva, 2007, 2008a); 2) There
is evidence showing that conservative earnings lead to positive economic outcomes such as
an amelioration of the problems derived from information asymmetries between informed
and uninformed investors (LaFond and Watts, 2008), better investment efficiency (Bus-
hman, Piotroski and Smith, 2006; Ahmed and Duellman, 2008), improvements in contrac-
ting efficiency (Ball, Robin and Sadka, 2008), decreases in the cost of debt (Ahmed, Billings,
Morton and Stanford-Harris, 2002; Vander Bauwhede, 2007); and in the cost of equity ca-
pital (García Lara, García Osma and Penalva, 2008b), and 3) Because conservatism in ear-
nings differs substantially across accounting regimes and it has been shown to be one of
the main international differences in the properties of accounting earnings (Pope and Wal-
ker, 1999; Ball et al., 2000; Giner and Rees, 2001; García Lara and Mora, 2003, 2004; Rao-
nic, McLeay and Asimakopoulos, 2004; García Lara et al., 2005; Bushman and Piotroski,
2006; Gassen, Fülbier and Sellhorn, 2006).
Our results show that 1) Earnings conservatism is, as pointed out in prior research, more
pronounced in common-law countries; 2) The use of IASB standards in Europe has signi-
ficantly increased the measures of earnings conservatism in adopting firms, and 3) The use
of IAS fails to improve the relevance and reliability of accounting information in emer-
ging/developing countries. Our results are consistent with high quality accounting stan-
dards increasing the quality of financial information only if properly enforced and when ap-
propriate corporate governance mechanisms are in place to protect investors.
The remainder of the paper is as follows: in Section 2 we analyse the reasons underlying
the adoption of IASB standards across countries and comment on the expected effects over
conservatism in earnings, in Section 3 we describe the hypotheses development and rese-
arch design. Section 4 analyses the results and Section 5 concludes.
(1)  We use the term earnings conservatism to refer to the asymmetric timeliness of earnings described by Basu (1997).
Other terms used in the literature to identify the same phenomenon are «income statement conservatism», «news-driven
conservatism», «ex-post conservatism» or «conditional conservatism».
2.  INTERNATIONAL ADOPTION OF IASB STANDARDS AND ITS EFFECTS
OVER CONSERVATISM IN EARNINGS
The implementation of IASB standards in different countries responds to different regula-
tory incentives. In the European Union, IASB standards are compulsory for listed firms, to
prepare their consolidated financial statements, from 2005 onwards. Before 2005, the use
of IASB standards was allowed in France and Germany. In the EU case, the adoption of the
international standards responds to the interest of the European Commission of improving
the comparability of accounting information in Europe. The comparability of accounting in-
formation is a basic requisite to improve the allocation of rents among competing firms/pro-
jects and to improve the efficiency of the internal financial markets. While in the EU com-
parability is the main objective of introducing international standards, in developing
economies the basic interest of using IASB standards is to ensure a certain degree of qua-
lity in the information provided through the financial statements, both in terms of relevan-
ce and reliability. In both cases, EU and developing countries, another incentive to adopt
IASB standards relates to the fact that the SEC (Securities and Exchange Commission, the
financial market regulatory body in the US and a member of IOSCO) was expected to accept
IASB-compliant financial statements for the purpose of cross-listing in US financial markets.
Looking at the European case, prior evidence suggests that some of the differences in the
properties of accounting numbers across European countries are attributable to differen-
tial institutional settings that give managers different incentives to reflect in a different way
the same economic events in the financial statements. This is especially relevant in the ca-
se of conservatism. Differences in the ownership structure, litigation exposure of managers
and auditors, shareholder protection mechanisms, etc… lead to pronounced differences in
earnings conservatism across countries that the use of a single set of standards will not be
able to eliminate if the differences in the institutional context remain and managers’ in-
centives continue to differ.
As earnings conservatism has been pointed out as one of the main source of differences in the
properties of earnings across countries, in this study we focus on whether differences in ear-
nings conservatism exist across firms using their own local GAAP or using IASB standards.
2.1.  CONSERVATISM IN EARNINGS
Conservatism in earnings is a temporary question, and does not imply understating ear-
nings consistently, as the very same accrual principle would prevent this. Basu (1997) de-
fines conservatism in earnings as the asymmetric treatment of gains and losses in the pro-
fit and loss account. Losses are recognised on a timelier basis than gains. As Givoly and
Hayn (2000) point out, conservatism in the profit and loss account is a question of the ti-
ming and sequencing of earnings relative to their associated cash-flows. They argue that,
under a steady state, and over a sufficiently long period, accounting based measures of per-
formance will converge to the true economic performance. This argument is similar to the
error-cancelling argument in Zhang (2000), where he shows that if there is no growth, ac-
counting earnings asymptotically equal economic earnings (2). Even assuming growth, con-
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(2)  See analytical demonstration in Zhang (2000, p. 132).
servatism in earnings will only affect (decrease) the book value of shareholders’ equity tem-
porarily (the lags described in Beaver and Ryan, 2000), until the reversal of the accruals.
2.2.  EFFECTS OF THE ADOPTION OF IASB STANDARDS OVER CONSERVATISM IN EARNINGS
As pointed out in the IASB’s conceptual framework (IASC, 1989), the objective of finan-
cial statements is to provide information about the financial position, performance and
about the changes in the financial position of an enterprise that is useful to a wide ran-
ge of decision makers in making economic decisions. The IASB’s framework describes
four qualitative characteristics that accounting information should have to be useful to
this wide range of users (investors, lenders, employees, government, etc.): i) understan-
dability; ii) relevance; iii) reliability, and iv) comparability.
While most developed countries (all EU countries) have accounting systems based on Ge-
nerally Accepted Accounting Principles similar to the ones stated by the IASB, which lead
to relevant and reliable information, firms in developing countries have shifted towards IAS
in an attempt to improve the quality of their accounting information. As we already poin-
ted out, the objective of EU countries with the adoption of the IASB standards is to impro-
ve comparability. Either in developing countries, or in the European Union, one might ex-
pect that given that IASB standards are closer to common-law countries’ accounting
standards, the adoption of IAS would lead to accounting earnings characteristics, like con-
servatism, being closer to common-law earnings. However, analysing prior literature (for
example, García Lara et al., 2005 for European countries or Ball et al., 2003 for Asian
countries) the expectation could be that given that differences in the institutional context do
not change and that enforcement (especially in Asian countries) is low, the properties of
earnings will not change by using IAS.
Looking at the European Union case, the use of 25 different accounting standards was an
obvious barrier to the comparability of accounting information, making it difficult to allo-
cate capital in an efficient way among EU firms. Most local investors used to invest in local
firms just because they knew their accounting standards. This situation was undermining
the efficiency in the allocation of economic resources and was constraining the range of in-
vestment choices of EU citizens. However, prior literature that analyses the international
differences in earnings conservatism points out that differences will not disappear just
using a set of common standards, as the differences arise because of the different institu-
tional settings. Most of this literature compares common-law accounting regimes (Anglo-
Saxon regimes: US, UK, Ireland) with code-law based countries [all European continental
countries (3)].
The different role of financial statements in countries with common-law and code-law ac-
counting systems lead to international differences in conservatism (See Ball et al., 2000). In
common-law countries (typical examples are the US and the UK), the ownership of the firm
is very widespread, and firms seek capital funds directly from small investors through the
capital markets. Investors in these countries demand very informative accounting infor-
mation, and financial statements are the only source of information about the financial af-
fairs of the firm that most of these small investors have. This demand for information is es-
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(3)  Being The Netherlands a distinctive case in between common-law and code-law based countries.
pecially important for investors in the case of bad news, as we can assume that they are
risk averse. Investors will be willing and able to sue managers and auditors if they fail to
disclose bad news on a very timely basis. This enhances the asymmetry in the recognition
of good and bad news that the accounting system, per se, already has.
This demand for an asymmetric recognition of good and bad news in earnings (earnings
conservatism) is not so important in code-law based countries. In code-law based countries
the main providers of capital funds (even through the capital markets) are financial insti-
tutions. These financial institutions have other timelier sources of information about the
firm than financial statements. They are even represented in the board of directors. Con-
sequently, the demand for earnings conservatism in these countries is lower than in com-
mon-law based countries. Banks in code-law based countries demand conservative valua-
tion of assets (balance sheet conservatism), and this more pronounced balance sheet
conservative behaviour leads to less asymmetry in the recognition of good and bad news in
earnings, that is, to less pronounced earnings conservatism practices (see Pope and Wal-
ker, 2003; and Beaver and Ryan, 2005). Other institutional features, for example, the de-
mand for smoothed income streams (see Ball et al., 2000; and Bao and Bao, 2004) will al-
so contribute to less pronounced earnings conservatism in code-law based countries.
Consistent with this explanation of the difference in the demand for earnings conservatism
across code and common-law based countries, Ball et al. (2000) and Bushman and Pio-
troski (2006) find the US more conservative than code-law based countries. In Europe, Gar-
cía Lara et al. (2005) show that the UK is more conservative from a profit and loss account
perspective than France and Germany (typical code-law based countries). They show that
prior findings of similar levels of earnings conservatism between the UK and European co-
de-law based countries are severely influenced by earnings management practices in Con-
tinental European countries.
Bearing in mind this more pronounced earnings conservatism in common-law countries
found in prior literature (Ball et al., 2000; García Lara et al., 2005, Bushman and Piotros-
ki, 2006), one might think that by using IASB standards, which are closer to common-law
countries’ standards (closer to US or UK GAAP), earnings conservatism should increase in
code-law based European firms. However, the factors explaining why code-law based firms
are more conservative in earnings than common-law based firms relate directly to institu-
tional features in each country (litigation risk, smoothing of earnings due to taxation and
dividend policy), and this will not change by using a common set of accounting standards.
Our main objective is, thus, analysing whether the use of the IASB standards will have an
effect over earnings conservatism of adopting firms, or if the institutional factors will do-
minate and determine the properties of earnings regardless of the set of standards that
firms use. Our results are consistent with the regulatory change improving the quality of fi-
nancial reporting only in the presence of strong enforcement and investor protection me-
chanisms.
3.  RESEARCH DESIGN
We analyse the effects of IAS implementation in countries with low quality local standards,
poor enforcement and corporate governance mechanisms (for example East Asian coun-
tries) vs the effects of IAS implementation in countries with high quality local standards and
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better enforcement and governance mechanisms (for example continental European coun-
tries).
Given the low relevance and reliability of accounting information from developing countries,
for example, East-Asian countries, the use of IASB standards by firms in these countries is
expected to contribute to make their accounting information more similar to the one repor-
ted by firms in common-law countries. When analysing conservatism, this expectation of in-
creased quality in earnings numbers by using IASB standards should translate into more
conservative accounting numbers, that is, a more pronounced asymmetry in earnings cau-
sed by bad news being recognised in a timelier basis. However, and as pointed out by Ball
et al. (2003), the absence of enforcement mechanisms, together with the use of different and
ad-hoc versions of the IASB standards, lead to a decrease in the relevance and reliability of
accounting numbers in these countries, which would be making accounting information not
timely at all. On the other hand, in countries where a set of high quality accounting stan-
dards exist, the use of IAS is expected to maintain a high level of earnings conservatism. This
is the case of continental European countries, where earnings conservatism is even expec-
ted to increase (from a regulatory point of view) given that most continental European ac-
counting regulations are more conservative from a balance sheet perspective, forcing ear-
nings conservatism measures downwards (see an analysis of the relation between earnings
and balance sheet conservatism in Pope and Walker, 2003, and Beaver and Ryan, 2005).
To test these predictions we compare samples of firms using and not using IAS, coming
from several country sets: i) common-law countries; ii) code-law countries; iii) European
code-law countries; iv) Emerging countries; v) Firms using IAS worldwide, and vi) Firms
using IAS in Europe. The objective is to see whether there are significant differences in con-
servatism across the different country sets. We are aware that these sets of countries/firms
are very heterogeneous, and that the results are obviously affected by differences in the
sample composition.
THE SAMPLE
The initial sample («IAS sample») to test our first set of analyses consists of 874 firms from
58 countries that adopted voluntarily the IASB standards for financial reporting purposes
over the period 1994-2003. The sample is drawn from Compustat Global, and we identify
whether the firm is using IAS through the variable «standard note». For comparative pur-
poses, we also use a sample of firms from 20 developed or emerging countries, which used
domestic GAAP during the same period, with a total of 12,057 firms, and 79,052 firm-year
observations. We will compare the earnings attributes of firms using IAS with the earnings
attributes of groups of firms from common-law, code-law and emerging countries. Table 1
provides a description of the sample composition per country, and Table 2 provides sample
descriptive statistics. We group firms according to whether they are domiciled in a com-
mon-law, code-law or emerging country, and according to whether the firm uses IAS or lo-
cal GAAP. The descriptive statistics are consistent with the existence of earnings conserva-
tism in all groups of firms, that is, earnings is negatively skewed in all groups (medians
exceed means). Also, we can see that the standard deviation of returns is always larger than
the standard deviation of earnings, consistent with the intrinsic characteristics of accoun-
ting numbers, less affected by news. These descriptive statistics are consistent with prior
research.
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TABLE 1
COMPOSITION OF TOTAL SAMPLE
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Local-GAAP IAS
Country Classification Firms Observations Firms Observations
Australia Common-Law 376 2,035 3 15
Austria Code-Law 28 150 42 241
Belgium Code-Law 104 567 16 104
Canada Common-Law 468 3,472
France Code-Law 586 2,973 33 237
Germany Code-Law 341 1,664 263 1,167
Hong Kong Emerging 238 1,470 1 2
Italy Code-Law 163 672 85 441
Japan Code-Law 3,458 24,709
Malaysia Emerging 821 4,254 3 30
Netherlands ? 147 1,008 11 44
New Zealand Common-Law 66 322 1 4
Singapore Emerging 447 1,976 2 3
South Africa Common-Law 88 516 18 135
Spain Code-Law 132 802 2 6
Switzerland Code-Law 108 491 129 787
Taiwan Emerging 234 1,061
Thailand Emerging 361 2,051 1 10
United Kingdom Common-Law 1,145 6,889 4 9
United States Common-Law 2,746 21,970
Other countries (38) 260 1,166
TOTAL 12,057 79,052 874 4,401
TABLE 2




Mean 0,02 0,03 -0,02 0,02
Median 0,03 0,05 0,04 0,05
St. Deviation 0,11 0,19 0,34 0,22
Number Obs 31,415 34,664 10,663 4,330
Rit
Mean -0,01 0,16 0,10 0,11
Median -0,06 0,07 -0,03 0,03
St. Deviation 0,38 0,63 0,67 0,57
Number Obs. 33,105 37,360 11,971 4,796
Notes:
For each firm i and fiscal year t, Xit denotes annual earnings per share before extraordinary items deflated by beginning of fiscal
year price; Rit denotes security return over the fiscal year. The top and bottom percentiles of Xit and Rit are excluded, as well as
observations with missing values.
CONSERVATISM TESTS
To measure the level of earnings conservatism we use stock returns as a proxy for news,
and estimate the model proposed by Basu (1997):
Xit = β0 + β1RDit + β2Rit + β3RitRDit + εit (1)
where: X is earnings per share deflated by share price at the beginning of the fiscal year t,
R is the rate of return (inclusive of dividends) over the fiscal year t, and RD is a dummy va-
riable that takes value 1 in case of bad news (negative or zero rate of return), and 0 other-
wise. We use different definitions of earnings (before and after extraordinary and special
items); and returns (measured using a 12 month window over the fiscal year, over a 12
month window finishing 3 months after the balance sheet date, and using 15 month win-
dows covering the fiscal year plus 3 months) (4).
We estimate equation [1] for each accounting system from a pooled cross-section (across
firms) and time-series (fiscal years) regression. The coefficient β2 measures the average
contemporaneous sensitivity of accounting earnings reported by firms in each group to po-
sitive changes in market value of equity (economic gains). The coefficient β3 measures the
incremental response of accounting earnings to negative changes in market value of equity
(economic losses). The total response or sensitivity of accounting earnings to negative chan-
ges in market value of equity is measured by (β2 + β3). Following Giner and Rees (2001), we
estimate whether the conservatism coefficient (β3) is significantly different across the diffe-
rent groups as:
[φ1 – φ2/ σ21 + σ22 ] t (2)
where φi is the estimated coefficient and σi the standard error for variable i.
4.  RESULTS
Table 3 presents the results of running Equation [1] for six different groups: 
i) Firms in common-law countries using their own local GAAP (Australia, Canada, New
Zealand, South Africa, United Kingdom and United States).
ii) Firms in code-law countries using their own local GAAP (Austria, Belgium, France,
Germany, Italy, Japan, Spain and Switzerland) (5).
iii) As in (ii) but excluding Japan. That is, only European code-law firms.
iv) Firms in emerging countries using local GAAP (Hong Kong, Malaysia, Singapore, Tai-
wan and Thailand).
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(4)  There is an ongoing debate (started with the paper by Dietrich, Muller and Riedl, 2007) on whether the Basu (1997)
regression offers unbiased measures of earnings conservatism. Ryan (2006) argues that the biases (if any) are small, and
Ball and Kothari (2007) analytically demonstrate the validity of the Basu specification.
(5)  In a sensitivity test we replicate this analysis including The Netherlands in the code-law based group. The Netherlands
can be considered as a hybrid accounting system in between code-law and common-law systems. It is based on the mi-
croeconomic theory and although traditionally considered as closer to common-law regimes (see Nobes, 1983), results
from prior international studies on earnings conservatism for Dutch firms describe them as closer to code-law firms’ coun-
tries (see for example García Lara and Mora, 2004).
v) All firms using IAS identified in Compustat Global (58 countries).
vi) Firms using IAS in our European main sample (Austria, Belgium, France, Germany,
Italy, Spain and Switzerland).
TABLE 3
COMPARISON OF EARNINGS CONSERVATISM ACROSS GROUPS OF FIRMS COMING FROM DIFFERENT ACCOUNTING
REGIMES AND USING DIFFERENT ACCOUNTING STANDARDS
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(6)  The β2 coefficient is, as expected, very close to zero. However, it is surprisingly negative. This is due to the existence
of extreme observations that are not discarded with the typical outlier removal of the top and bottom percentile of each va-
riable. We replicate this test removing more outliers (2%, 5%, and the β2 coefficient becomes positive).
Sample β0 β1 β2 β3 Adj. R2 (%) N
Common-Law 0.05 -0.00 -0.02 0.30
(33.53) (-1.66) (-8.05) (33.92)
9.54 33,927
Code-Law 0.04 -0.01 0.03 0.08
(27.82) (-4.54) (8.69) (13.27) 6.31 30,817
Code-Law excluding Japan 0.06 -0.00 0.01 0.24
(23.18) (-0.63) (1.67) (15.43) 13.02 6,828
Emerging countries 0.02 -0.03 0.03 0.15
(4.05) (-3.18) (2.81) (6.91) 3.75 10,455
IAS 0.06 0.01 0.00 0.03
(11.03) (0.53) (0.07) (11.68) 10.43 4,241
IAS-Europe 0.06 0.01 -0.02 0.39
(9.23) (0.47) (-1.20) (11.84) 13.24 2,931
Notes:
Sample: Firms adopting IAS during the period 1994-2003 are aggregated into the «IAS» sample. The «IAS-Europe» subsample only
includes firms from Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and Switzerland. 
Firms from countries adopting their domestic standards during the same period are included into three benchmark accounting
systems: a) «Common-Law» (Australia, Canada, New Zealand, South Africa, UK, and USA); b) «Code-Law» (Austria, Belgium, Fran-
ce, Germany, Italy, Japan, Spain, and Switzerland); and c) «Emerging» (Hong Kong, Malaysia, Singapore, Taiwan, and Thailand).
Model:
Xit = β0 + β1RDit + β2Rit + β3RitRDit + εit
For each firm i and fiscal year t: Xit denotes annual earnings per share before extraordinary items deflated by beginning of fiscal ye-
ar price; Rit denotes security return over the fiscal year; and RDit = 1 if Rit < 0 (market value decrease over the fiscal year) and =0
otherwise (market value increase).
N denotes the number of firm-year observations available for each accounting system. The top and bottom percentiles of Xit and Rit
are excluded.
Analysis: Statistics are from regressions using the pooled cross-section and time-series of firm-year observations for each sample.
To control for heteroskedasticity, reported t-statistics in brackets are calculated using the White (1980) variance-covariance matrix.
The results show that for the common-law group (group i) results are consistent with prior
research. Conservatism exists —earnings are clearly asymmetric, β3 equals 0.30— and the go-
od news coefficient (β2) is close to zero(6). The intercept is positive and significant, showing the
effect of prior period good news. If we focus on the code-law group (ii), we see that results are
dominated by Japanese firms. As in Ball et al. (2000) Japan is much less conservative than
common-law countries. In our sample, the conservatism coefficient β3 for the code-law sam-
ple including Japan is 0.08, and the difference with the β3 coefficient from common-law coun-
tries is significanty different (t-stat: 20.55). If we drop Japan from the code-law sample (group
iii), we see that the β3 coefficient rises to 0.24. This is consistent with prior evidence on Euro-
pean countries (Giner and Rees, 2001, García Lara and Mora, 2004, Bushman and Piotroski,
2006), but we should note that the difference with the common-law firms is still significant (t-
stat 2.93). García Lara et al. (2005) argue that the measures of conservatism in European co-
de-law based countries are inflated due to earnings management practices that purposefully
decrease earnings for tax and dividend policy reasons. For the two code-law samples the go-
od news coefficient is positive and close to zero, and the intercepts are significant.
Looking at the emerging countries using their own local GAAP (sample iv), the results show
that these firms are also significantly (t-stat 6.40) less conservative than firms in common-
law based countries. The very low coefficient of determination may also be pointing at a
very low relevance of accounting numbers in these countries, which is consistent with the
results in Ball et al. (2003).
Finally, with regards to the two IAS samples, sample (v) for all countries, and sample (vii) for
European countries, we find the following. When we use all firms using IASB standards, re-
sults are difficult to interpret due to the tremendous firm heterogeneity, although given that
we find very low β2 and β3 coefficients we might think that the lack of enforcement in most
countries lead to low relevance and low reliability of accounting information. If we focus on
European firms using IAS the interpretation is much clearer. We observe a significant incre-
ase in the β3 coefficient (t-stat: 4.50) with respect to firms from the same countries using local
GAAP. This increase could be attributable to IASB standards (IAS 16) being less balance she-
et conservative than local European continental GAAPs and, consequently, leading to more
conservative earnings numbers (see Beaver and Ryan, 2005). Also, European firms using IAS
might be listed in other markets, more widely held, and subject to pressures other than tho-
se from the European continental institutional context (see Raonic et al. 2004).
In addition, we test if the conservative measures derived from model [1] for the IAS sample
are significantly different before and after the adoption of the IAS, by running the following
regression:
Xit = β0 + β0DDIit + β1RDit + β1DRDitDIit + β2Rit +
+ β2DRitDIit + β3RitRDit + β3DRitRDitDIit + εit (3)
where DIit = 1 when accounting earnings of firm i in fiscal year t is reported under IAS, and
DIit = 0 when domestic GAAP were used. Model (3) is separately estimated over the IAS sub-
sample formed by retaining firms from the seven continental European (code-law) coun-
tries, and over the IAS subsample that puts together firms from the rest of the world. Ta-
ble 4 displays the results. While for the European sample we observe that the β3D coefficient
of 0.12 (t = 2.18) confirms a significant increase in the contemporaneous earnings respon-
se to bad news when the IASB standards are adopted, when we look at firms from other
countries we see that the β3D coefficient is not significant. Therefore, we cannot conclude
that the adoption of IAS in non-European countries over our sample period implies an in-
crease in earnings conservatism.
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TABLE 4
COMPARATIVE ASYMMETRY IN THE CONTEMPORANEOUS ASSOCIATION BETWEEN EARNINGS
AND RETURNS BEFORE AND AFTER THE IAS ADOPTION
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β2 β2D β3 β3D Adj. R2 (%) N
European countries 0.05 -0.04 0.17 0.12
(2.64) (-1.63) (3.87) (2.18) 15.87 2,811
Other 0.02 0.03 0.24 -0.09 9.06 1,417
Countries (0.45) (0.61) (3.58) (-1.10)
Notes:
Sample: Firms adopting IAS during the period 1994-2003 are aggregated into two subsamples: firms from 7 continental European
countries (Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and Switzerland), and firms from other countries.
Model: 
Xit = β0 + β0DDIit + β1RDit + β1DRDitDIit + β2Rit + β2DRitDIit + β3RitRdit + β3DRitRDitDIit + εit
For each firm i and fiscal year t: Xit denotes annual earnings per share before extraordinary items deflated by beginning of fiscal ye-
ar price, Rit denotes security return over the fiscal year; RDit = 1 if Rit < 0 (market value decrease over the fiscal year) and = 0 other-
wise (market value increase); and DIit = 1 when accounting earnings is reported under the IAS and = 0 under domestic GAAP.
N denotes the number of firm-year observations available. The top and bottom percentiles of XPit and Rit are excluded, as well as
observations with missing values.
Analysis: Statistics are from regressions using the pooled cross-section and time-series of firm-year observations for each sub-
sample. Results are not reported for the intercepts. To control for heteroskedasticity, reported t-statistics in brackets are calculated
using the White (1980) variance-covariance matrix.
SENSITIVITY TESTS
To confirm the robustness of our results we replicate our main tests using different defini-
tions of returns. In our main tests we calculate returns over the fiscal year. We also calcu-
late them over a 12-month-window finishing 3 months after the fiscal year end, and over a
15 month window finishing 3 months after the fiscal year. Results are not sensitive to the-
se different definitions of returns.
In our main tests we use earnings before extraordinary and special items. However, and fo-
llowing Pope and Walker (1999), we replicate our tests with bottom-line earnings, as ma-
nagers might use extraordinary and special items differently in different accounting regi-
mes, especially to avoid capturing bad news in the profit and loss account through ordinary
earnings. Using bottom-line earnings our results do not change qualitatively.
We also use Fama and MacBeth (1973) mean annual regressions to avoid our results being
driven by cross-sectional dependence problems. Although the results are similar to the ones
reported with the pooled samples, we choose to report the pooled results as we have se-
rious concerns about the robustness of mean annual regressions for our samples. The num-
ber of observations in the early years of most of our samples (especially the IAS ones) is very
limited, which prevents running robust regressions. For most of the samples we only have
7 years of data to run the Basu tests, which puts into question the assumption of normality
of the parameters obtained from Fama and MacBeth (1973) mean annual regressions. Al-
so, and as pointed out by Basu (1999), Fama and MacBeth regressions assume stationary
parameters, and as we know, some of the accounting regimes under study have changed
significantly over the last years. Thus, assuming that the parameters are stationary is ques-
tionable.
We also control for differences in the market to book ratio and size, as a first control for dif-
ferences in economic characteristics and sample composition across the different groups.
The results of these tests are consistent with prior research. As expected, firms with high
market to book ratios (firms that understate more assets, with more balance sheet conser-
vatism) are less conservative in earnings. Also, small firms are more earnings conservati-
ve than large firms. This is consistent with prior research, but relatively surprising. Basu
(2001) explains this surprising result on the grounds of smaller firms being riskier and fa-
cing larger litigation risk. García Lara et al. (2005) also argue that smaller firms in conti-
nental European countries engage more in income decreasing earnings management that
increase the measures of earnings conservatism. Results of comparisons of conservatism
between groups of firms using or not IAS across subsamples of size and the market to bo-
ok ratio are consistent with the results described for the full sample.
5.  SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
In this study we analyse whether the use of IASB standards affects the conservatism of ear-
nings of the firms that adopt them. We compare the conservatism of firms by groups of
firms/countries using or not IAS. Our results show that the use of IAS in non-European
countries does not yield timely accounting numbers (untimely good and bad news recogni-
tion in earnings). This result confirms prior evidence by Ball et al. (2003) that the lack of
enforcement mechanisms and investor protection mechanisms hinder the quality of ac-
counting information even if accounting standards are considered as high quality. This sug-
gests emerging countries should improve their enforcement mechanisms, as the adoption
of IASB standards is not enough, per se, to increase accounting quality.
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